Shareholder Spotlight : Fisher Investments Part Three – They Were Warned, They Bought More, So Fuck The Takedown

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Fisher Investments Cummins stake increases despite diesel scandal

The Fisher Investments Cummins stake just got bigger. TCAP hit Fisher Investments once. TCAP hit Fisher Investments twice. Now Fisher Asset Management’s latest SEC filing shows the bastards increased their Cummins position again, from 3,410,723 shares to 3,497,060 shares. That is 86,337 more shares in the diesel giant after the record was already public, after the emissions settlement was already sitting in the government file, after Fisher’s own grubby history had already been laid out, and after TCAP had already put their name on the wall twice. They do not get a takedown. They get Part Three.

The Fisher Investments Cummins Stake Got Bigger

There it is.

No mystery. No leak. No anonymous source with a folder. Nobody needs to picture some dim little committee room where polite scum stare at a spreadsheet and pretend morality is not a column. The SEC filing says enough.

At the end of Q4 2025, Fisher Asset Management reported 3,410,723 Cummins shares, worth about $1.741 billion. By Q1 2026, that had risen to 3,497,060 shares, worth about $1.881 billion. That is another 86,337 shares.

Not a reduction. Not a retreat. Not a nervous shuffle away from the diesel table after being named twice by TCAP. More.

These cunts were not dragged accidentally into Cummins by a passing index cloud. They were not asleep inside some passive allocation hammock. Fisher had an enormous Cummins position, got named, had the wider record put in public, and then the next filing turned up with the number higher.

That is the article. Everything else is the paperwork explaining why that sentence matters.

Part One Was The Warning Shot

Part One was called Fishy Investments LLC for a reason.

It put Fisher Investments on TCAP’s Shareholder Spotlight board and made the basic point: this is a money-management machine with a public history ugly enough to make the client brochure look like evidence with the fingerprints wiped off.

Ken Fisher’s sexist gob. Client exits. Elder-abuse allegations. Telemarketing complaints. Legal fights. Arbitration mess. The whole polished wealth-management routine with a smile on the website and something colder waiting in the client agreement.

That was July 2025.

At that stage, Fisher already belonged in the Cummins ecosystem. The stake was already large. The firm already had no business sitting there in a clean shirt pretending this was normal institutional exposure.

They had room to reduce. They had the chance to exit. Instead, they decided that a fat Cummins holding after a record emissions-cheating settlement was apparently still fine for a firm built around retirees, fiduciary language and trust.

They did not take the room. They filled it with more stock.

Part Two Was Not Subtle Either

Part Two was Caught In The Net – Fisher Investments LLC Part Two.

That one was not a polite update. It went straight at the sales machine, the cold-call stink, the arbitration cupboard, the six-figure award, the elder-abuse allegation, the culture of growth, and the Cummins connection sitting in the middle like a signature on the wrong page.

Part Two recorded Fisher still sitting on Cummins’ shareholder register with around 3.28 million shares as of 30 June 2025. By Q1 2026, the number was 3.497 million.

So do not let anyone pretend this is stale.

The increase is fresh. So is Fisher’s own filing. More importantly, after two public hits, after the Cummins settlement, after the sales-machine reporting, after the public complaints and after the fiduciary sermon, Fisher still moved deeper into Cummins.

That is why Part Three cannot be nice.

Nice is for misunderstandings.

This is not one.

This Is Not Ignorance. It Is Contempt.

There is a point where “maybe they didn’t know” becomes insulting.

Cummins’ emissions record is not hidden. EPA says Cummins agreed to a $1.675 billion penalty, the largest civil penalty in Clean Air Act history, over vehicle emission-control violations. The settlement covered allegations involving defeat devices and undisclosed software features in Ram vehicles. Cummins denied wrongdoing, because apparently even a record penalty can still travel with a corporate shrug.

But the record exists.

Any firm managing hundreds of billions can find it. Analysts can find it. Compliance can find it. Even an intern with a search engine and a pulse can find it before the coffee goes cold.

So when Fisher increases its Cummins stake, TCAP is not treating that as ignorance.

It is contempt.

Contempt for the record. Contempt for the public. Contempt for anyone stupid enough to believe the fiduciary sermon means anything when the filing says otherwise.

The Fiduciary Costume

Fisher loves the fiduciary language. Of course it does. Every wealth firm loves that word. It sounds like a clean hand placed gently on a client’s shoulder while the fee schedule waits in the drawer.

Fisher’s own page says a fiduciary is obligated to put clients’ interests first when making investment decisions. It says this is a differentiating feature of Fisher Investments. It talks about trust being at the heart of a client-adviser relationship. Fisher also claims its structure, values and culture are designed so it always does what is right for clients.

Then the filing says 3,497,060 Cummins shares.

That is where the costume starts coming apart.

So what exactly does “client first” mean when the firm is increasing exposure to a diesel giant with one of the ugliest emissions settlements in American corporate history? Where does long-term stewardship sit when the holding grows after the scandal is already baked into the public record? And what kind of fiduciary seriousness says, “Yes, the Clean Air Act file is disgusting, but have we considered buying more?”

The answer is simple.

The language is for the client. The holding is for the machine.

The Fiduciary Costume Got Its Own Fucking Website

Because Fisher apparently looked at the word fiduciary and thought, “we should own more of that”, the firm launched Fiduciary.com.

The pitch was predictable. Investor education. Standards of care. Due diligence. Fees. Values. Custody. How to choose a wealth manager. The usual little chapel built around a word that makes nervous people feel safer about handing over their future.

Then the Fiduciary Institute covered criticism of the site as “naked lead-generation” and described it as a form of fiduciary-washing. That is the part that belongs in this file.

Fisher does not just use fiduciary language. It brands it. Packages it. Buys the domain. Turns it into a funnel. Puts a clean sign over the doorway. Meanwhile, its SEC filing sits there with 3,497,060 Cummins shares like nobody is supposed to notice the contradiction.

That is not education.

That is a costume with a landing page.

A firm can tell investors to ask careful questions about values, conflicts, fees and trust. Fine. TCAP has one.

Why did Fisher increase its Cummins position after the emissions record was already public, after TCAP had already hit them twice, and after Fisher had spent so much effort turning fiduciary into a marketing asset?

Because this is the trick. The word is for the client. Meanwhile, the holding is for the machine. The site says trust, while the filing says Cummins. The rest is lead capture with cleaner table manners.

The Fisher Machine Knows How To Get Near People’s Money

This is not just another asset manager with a boring allocation.

Fisher’s public history matters because of the type of machine it is. This is a firm built around relentless growth, client acquisition and asset gathering. Bloomberg reporting, carried by InvestmentNews, described hard-selling that prospective customers called relentless. Marketers allegedly called homes, spammed work email and impersonated friends, colleagues and government officials. Government records reportedly showed 125 FTC grievances since 2016, with almost 90 percent involving phone calls.

Fisher disputed the complaints and said it did not make cold calls. Fine. Their denial belongs in the file too.

But so do the complaints. So does the pattern. Most importantly, so does the fact that prospects allegedly described excessive calls, do-not-call frustration, workplace contact, dead relatives being solicited, and pressure on elderly and vulnerable people. That is not background colour. That is the business model breathing through the wall.

The retiree hears planning. A household hears security. An advert says retirement income, while the website says fiduciary. Then the phone rings, the brochure arrives, the follow-up lands, and the machine keeps moving.

Somewhere behind that soft front door sits $1.881 billion of Cummins.

That is why Fisher deserves ripping up. They are not just buying dirty exposure with their own lunch money. They are managing other people’s futures while presenting themselves as careful guardians. The Cummins holding is not a private vice. It is a public filing attached to a trust business.

The Complaints Still Sound Familiar

The public complaint trail has not gone silent either.

The Better Business Bureau currently lists 11 complaints for Fisher Investments over the last three years, with 2 closed in the last 12 months. The newest displayed complaint, dated February 2026, alleges repeated calls from rotating toll-free numbers despite previous attempts to stop contact.

Fisher responded that its records showed the person had submitted online requests in 2024 and 2025, agreed to meet with a representative, missed the meeting, and that the firm had no record of previous removal requests before unsubscribing the complainant from further outreach.

Fine. That is Fisher’s side. Put it in the file.

However, the allegation still sounds exactly like the old Fisher rhythm: contact, follow-up, pressure, persistence, friction. The same sales-machine smell TCAP has already written about. The same business model knocking on the door and then acting offended when someone says they heard the fucking bell the first twelve times.

Again: allegation, not finding.

Still, when the firm’s old reputation is relentless marketing and a fresh public complaint is still talking about repeated calls, the article does not need to invent a pattern.

It just has to read the room.

Ken Fisher’s Mouth Was The Free Sample

Ken Fisher’s 2019 conference comments blew up for a reason. The reported remarks were crude, sexist and stupid enough to make major clients run for the exit. Reuters reported that a Texas retirement system and Goldman Sachs pulled a combined $584 million after the allegations around Fisher’s comments. Other reports placed wider outflows above $3 billion.

That scandal matters because it showed what institutional money does when embarrassment becomes visible enough.

It exits, issues a statement, suddenly discovers values, and remembers fiduciary duty when the cameras are on and the founder’s mouth has made the problem impossible to spreadsheet away.

With Cummins, however, the embarrassment is different. It is not a viral conference line. It is not a clip. Nor is it an easy HR morality play. It is a dirty industrial record, a diesel settlement, a shareholder return story and a filing that pays quietly if the market behaves.

So Fisher stays.

Worse, Fisher adds.

That is the cold part. Public sexism costs reputation fast because nobody wants to sit next to it at lunch. Emissions-cheat baggage gets metabolised as investment exposure because the returns come wearing a suit.

That tells you plenty about the moral temperature of this industry.

The Elder-Abuse Allegation Belongs In The File

Part One and Part Two covered the 75-year-old woman who sued Fisher Investments, alleging financial elder abuse, constructive fraud, misrepresentation and trust-account mismanagement that allegedly left her facing nearly $1 million in taxes. She died before the case was resolved, with later reporting saying the dispute was headed into arbitration.

Keep the wording clean. Allegation, not finding.

But do not soften the horror until it becomes wallpaper.

A firm accused in that kind of client dispute should not get to float around the financial press as just another clever money manager. When you build a business near retirees, savings, pensions and people trying not to outlive their money, those allegations matter. They belong beside the marketing copy, the fiduciary page and the Cummins filing.

Because the same question keeps coming back.

What sort of firm asks the public to trust it with the future, then turns around and increases a billion-dollar-plus position in Cummins?

Fisher’s answer is in the SEC table.

More shares.

Arbitration Is Where Sunlight Gets Sent To Die

Fisher’s earlier file also includes arbitration. Of course it does.

Arbitration is the wealth-management industry’s favourite little room. Not because it is noble. Not because it is always fair. Because it is quieter. Courtrooms create records. Records create patterns. Patterns create questions. Questions are bad for the brochure.

Arbitration takes the mess off the main road.

A client dispute becomes a process. Then a complaint becomes a clause, a story becomes a PDF, and a human being with a grievance becomes a case number.

That is why the 13F filings matter so much. They are one of the places where the machine cannot fully hide. It can bury client fights in procedure, but it still has to report the holding.

And the holding says Fisher bought more Cummins.

Not whispered.

Filed.

Cummins Is Not A Victim Of Tone

Cummins will always have people trying to make this sound complicated.

They will talk about engineering. Then they will talk about transition, customers, power systems, data centres, backup power, hydrogen tabs, natural gas, Destination Zero, and whatever else the newsroom is currently polishing.

Fine. Let them talk.

EPA still says what it says.

Cummins agreed to a $1.675 billion penalty. EPA called it the largest civil penalty in Clean Air Act history. The settlement involved emissions violations, defeat devices and undisclosed software features. Cummins also has recall and mitigation obligations. That is not tone. That is not TCAP being rude. That is the government file.

And Fisher increased the stake.

So no, this is not about “harsh language”. The harshest thing in this article is the number in Fisher’s own filing.

The Shareholder Return Machine

Cummins is not sitting there in shame either.

In May 2026, Cummins said it returned $519 million to shareholders in the first quarter, pointed to record Power Systems performance, and highlighted strong demand for data-centre backup power. It also raised its full-year outlook and talked about returning cash to shareholders.

That is the Cummins machine in one clean little ledger entry.

Emissions baggage behind it. Data-centre power demand beneath it. Shareholder returns on top of it.

For Fisher, that is the attraction. Do not overcomplicate it. The Cummins bet is not about morality. It is about cash, scale, industrial demand, shareholder return and the kind of respectable dirty money that firms can defend with a straight face because the paperwork is tidy.

That is why the stake went up.

Fisher did not buy a redemption arc.

It bought exposure to a company still making the old machine pay.

The ESG Napkin Is Not Big Enough

Fisher has sustainability-related disclosures. Of course it does. Everyone in finance has the language now. ESG is the napkin they throw over the plate before serving the same old meat.

But there is no ESG paragraph big enough to cover 3,497,060 Cummins shares unless Fisher can point to serious, public, specific action taken as a shareholder to press Cummins over emissions accountability, diesel lock-in, data-centre power, labour issues, governance, or the wider Destination Zero pantomime.

Not vague engagement. Not “we consider material factors”. Not “our process incorporates risks”. Specific action, or the ESG language can fuck off back to the brochure pile.

Without that, the ESG language is just what it usually is in big finance: a padded room for reputational discomfort.

Fisher bought more.

That is the real disclosure.

These Cunts Do Not Get The Innocent Shareholder Defence

There is a defence these firms always want available.

They want to be treated as passive. Distant. Professional. Neutral. They want the holding to be financial but not moral, influential but not accountable, public but somehow not discussable.

No.

Not here.

A firm with more than $387 billion under management does not get to hold nearly $1.9 billion of Cummins and claim it is just scenery. Fisher is not a retail punter buying three shares after watching a YouTube video. Fisher is an asset-management machine with analysts, screens, governance language, client promises and enough money under supervision to make the word responsibility stop being optional.

They increased the stake after the record was there.

That makes them part of the Cummins ecosystem.

Not adjacent. Not accidentally nearby. Not floating at the edge.

Part of it.

Part Three Is The Refusal To Delete The File

So let’s make this plain.

Fisher Investments do not get to be hit twice, increase the stake, and then expect the internet to tidy itself up around them. They do not get a disappearing act. Nor do they get reputational housekeeping or a soft rewrite because the wording hurt their polished little feelings.

They get this.

A third entry. A cleaner file. A harder one.

The reason is simple: Fisher’s own filing gave TCAP the spine. They took everything already public – the Cummins emissions record, their own firm history, the client-side allegations, the sales-machine reputation, the arbitration cupboard, the fiduciary sermon, the Fiduciary.com costume – and then the share count went up.

That is not a misunderstanding.

That is a choice.

And choices have consequences. In this case, the consequence is being named again in the place where the sources stay up and the polite corporate language comes back with its pockets turned out.

No Takedown

The funniest part is how easy they made it.

TCAP did not need to find some hidden scandal for Part Three. Fisher supplied the update themselves, on a government filing, with the numbers lined up like evidence tags.

Q4 2025: 3,410,723 Cummins shares.

Q1 2026: 3,497,060 Cummins shares.

Difference: 86,337 more shares.

That is the article with its shirt off.

Fisher can keep talking fiduciary. It can still sell retirement calm, issue market commentary, and hide behind clean fonts, rich-man certainty and the dead little comfort of compliance language. None of that changes the filing.

They bought more Cummins.

After everything.

After the settlement. After the public record. After the first TCAP hit and the second. By then, their own baggage was already sitting there like a file nobody in compliance wanted to open.

So fuck the takedown.

Fisher Investments wanted more Cummins.

Now they have more TCAP.

Lee Thompson – Founder, The Cummins Accountability Project

Sources

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