
Somewhere between a frightened witness, a recruitment agency’s black marker and an Employment Judge deciding that a fair hearing was no longer possible, Newcastle Employment Tribunal developed a rather fascinating approach to evidence.
What a man might publish about a witness in the future became relevant to terminating a disability-discrimination claim. Meanwhile, the recruitment agency kept parts of the documentary record concerning what it actually did hidden behind black rectangles.
The witness had never encountered the claimant. His alleged apprehension reached the Tribunal through the respondent’s solicitor. The published judgment identifies no first-hand witness statement substantiating those fears.
Nevertheless, the Tribunal considered the claimant’s conduct sufficiently serious, the respondent’s witness sufficiently apprehensive and the proceedings sufficiently fucked to strike out the discrimination claim.
Welcome to the judicial tasting menu. The future arrives as a concern worthy of consideration. The past arrives covered in black rectangles.
And the bill? Twenty thousand pounds.
The Criminal Trial That Made Me Think
A recent criminal prosecution involving Russell Brand prompted an unusual hypothetical. Before anybody reaches for the outrage machine, the real proceedings ended with convictions on 5 November 2026 and a custodial sentence on 9 November. The complainants gave evidence. My hypothetical concerns a different question entirely.
What happens when a prosecution witness cannot or will not testify, but other evidence exists?
Contrary to what some might assume, the absence of a witness does not automatically bring criminal proceedings to an end. A court can sometimes proceed using other admissible evidence, provided the remaining material supports a fair trial and the prosecution can establish its case.
Section 116 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 offers one possible route for admitting statements from unavailable witnesses. The legislation recognises certain circumstances involving fear, subject to statutory conditions and judicial safeguards.
The court must consider fairness, the difficulty of challenging the statement and whether alternative arrangements could enable the witness to give evidence.
None of this guarantees a prosecution will survive. If the missing testimony leaves the prosecution without sufficient evidence, the case may fail.
But witness availability and evidential sufficiency are different questions.
That distinction matters.
From A Criminal Hypothetical To An Employment Tribunal
Now transport that principle into an Employment Tribunal.
Not a criminal court. Not allegations of sexual offending. A disability-discrimination claim involving a production job, a recruitment agency and an employer whose hiring decision never received a substantive judicial examination.
The respondent identifies a witness. Its solicitor tells the Tribunal that the witness fears what the claimant might publish about him. The claimant has never approached him.
Does that automatically make a fair hearing impossible?
Of course not. The Tribunal must examine the circumstances, assess the available evidence and decide whether appropriate measures can preserve fairness.
Employment Tribunals operate under different evidential rules from criminal courts. They also enjoy considerable procedural flexibility.
That flexibility creates an obvious question when one witness’s reported apprehension becomes part of the argument for terminating a claim.
What other evidence could the Tribunal have examined, and why would the witness’s reluctance prevent it from doing so?
In my case, the underlying documentary record already contained substantial material about recruitment, candidate communications and the employer’s decision-making process.
Some, even most, of that material remained partly redacted.
And therein lies the problem.
Peter Grey And The Fear Of A Future Blog Post
Peter Grey was identified as Cepac’s principal witness in Thompson v Cepac Limited and Page Outsourcing UK Limited, case 6019060/2024.
I had never met him, contacted him or approached him about giving evidence. Nevertheless, his reported apprehension became part of Cepac’s argument for bringing the proceedings to an end.
Paragraph 111 of Employment Judge Andrew James’s judgment records Daniel Rubin, representing Cepac through Horsfield Menzies, explaining that Grey did not wish to attend a final hearing.
Rubin argued that compelling Grey’s attendance would not solve the problem because Grey feared what I might subsequently publish about him. Cepac also invoked its duty of care towards its employee.
That was the respondent’s submission.
It wasn’t Grey personally answering questions about his apprehension.
I don’t know what Peter Grey genuinely felt. People can experience fear without receiving direct threats or personal contact. The absence of contact does not automatically make their feelings dishonest.
However, when that apprehension contributes to a decision denying somebody a substantive discrimination hearing, its evidential foundation matters enormously.
The question is not whether Grey could feel frightened. It is what evidence established the nature, cause and consequences of that fear.
Paragraph 170 And The Evidential Transformation
Paragraph 170 of James’s judgment refers to the “intimidation felt by a key witness”, alongside the withdrawal of Cepac’s former counsel, as considerations reinforcing his conclusion that a fair trial was no longer possible.
Compare that formulation with the submission recorded at paragraph 111.
The solicitor reported apprehension about future publication. Later, the judgment characterised the witness as having felt intimidation.
Those formulations deserve scrutiny, particularly where the judgment identifies no first-hand sworn statement from Grey explaining his position.
What exactly had the witness experienced? What had the claimant actually done towards him? Had anyone tested whether his apprehension prevented him from giving reliable evidence?
More importantly, what alternatives existed?
James had already reached adverse conclusions about my conduct. Grey’s reported apprehension was not the sole reason for strike-out, and I am not pretending otherwise.
But a reinforcing consideration still requires an appropriate evidential foundation.
If a respondent’s account of a witness’s anticipated fear helps justify ending a discrimination claim, asking how the Tribunal established that fear is hardly an outrageous fucking proposition.
Meanwhile, Behind Page’s Black Rectangles
Now consider the evidence I was trying to obtain.
Page Outsourcing held the recruitment records underpinning my original discrimination claim. Its 100-page subject access disclosure, dated 7 April 2025, contained candidate records, correspondence, internal discussions and exchanges concerning my complaint.
The visible material already raised questions about the recruitment chronology.
Page’s candidate records acknowledged my earlier employment at Cummins and a health-related employment gap. Its August correspondence also communicated that health information to Cepac.
That fact does not establish discrimination. It does, however, make the recipients, chronology and decision-making process important.
Meanwhile, the disclosure contained substantial redactions.
Page argued that certain material concerned third parties or did not constitute my personal data. Some third-party protections are entirely legitimate.
I have never needed another applicant’s private information to establish what happened to my own application.
But correspondence concerning my discrimination complaint, including emails headed Fw: Discrimination, deserved careful scrutiny to establish what information Page could lawfully disclose.
A black rectangle does not explain why the information beneath it deserves protection.
The Rejection Call That Doesn’t Appear In The Activity History
The disclosed recruitment activity table recorded a telephone conversation on 21 August 2024 and an attempted contact following my complaint on 8 October.
It contained no corresponding activity entry for the alleged rejection call that Page subsequently placed around 23 August.
That later explanation appears in a retrospective chronology circulated internally during December 2024.
Page asserted that somebody had telephoned me and explained that my application had failed because of the volume of candidates.
The available activity history did not independently corroborate that account.
Its absence does not prove nobody made the call. Page could possess additional telephone-system records, alternative activity categories or metadata that the DSAR did not reproduce.
But those possibilities need evidence.
And that is precisely why I wanted the original recruitment records examined, rather than another reassuring explanation from the people whose conduct the records concerned.
TCAP investigated the discrepancy separately in The Ghost Call And The Client Alibi.
Here, the problem is broader.
How can the fairness of proceedings receive proper consideration when the claimant continues fighting to obtain the documentary evidence underlying the original dispute?
The ICO Said Page Had More To Do
I didn’t simply complain about the redactions and accept defeat.
I challenged Page repeatedly. I requested explanations and pursued the matter through the Information Commissioner’s Office.
On 13 January 2026, I recorded the ICO’s position that Page had “more to do”, under complaint reference IC-380992-P1Z7.
That did not establish that every redaction breached data-protection law. Equally, it did not amount to a clean bill of health for Page’s handling of the disclosure.
I continued disputing Page’s response because I did not consider it an adequate resolution of the issues the ICO had identified.
The controller’s responsibilities under UK GDPR require an assessment of the actual information, including whether it constitutes personal data and whether an exemption or third-party right justifies withholding it.
An internal email can contain information about several people. It may require selective redaction rather than wholesale disclosure.
But Page cannot establish that correspondence about my complaint falls entirely outside my access rights merely by labelling it internal business information.
The question demands examination of the contents.
And throughout that unresolved dispute, the respondents continued pursuing strike-out based upon my conduct.
Houdini And The Relevance Of Evidence
Regional Employment Judge Sarah-Jane Davies subsequently entered this particular story.
When I pursued the disclosure of Page’s redacted correspondence, the Tribunal communicated the position that the disputed material was irrelevant to the forthcoming hearing.
That hearing concerned my conduct, not the merits of the discrimination claim.
I challenged the distinction.
My question was straightforward: if the concealed material revealed discrimination, could that evidence not also help explain the circumstances surrounding my conduct?
As I explained in my earlier article, The Redactions, The Refusal And The Return Of Houdini, I received no substantive answer addressing that question.
I wasn’t arguing that evidence of discrimination would excuse every offensive thing I had written. I was asking whether the respondents’ handling of the underlying dispute might bear upon the assessment of my reactions.
The Tribunal had every reason to consider relevant evidence about conduct. But the context of that conduct might also matter when deciding whether the most severe procedural sanction was proportionate.
Davies’ distinction between the merits and the conduct hearing described the scope of the proceedings.
It did not, by itself, answer my argument about the relationship between the two.
Conduct Does Not Happen In A Vacuum
There is an important distinction between explaining behaviour and excusing it.
My disability-related difficulties with emotional regulation under stress formed part of the background to these proceedings. I had also raised concerns about the respondents’ handling of the dispute, the difficulties obtaining documents and the procedural pressures I experienced as an unrepresented claimant.
None of those circumstances automatically justified inappropriate correspondence or publications.
But they raised questions about context, causation and proportionality.
A Tribunal examining whether conduct makes a fair hearing impossible can distinguish serious misconduct from the circumstances that contributed to it. It can also consider whether directions, restrictions or protective arrangements could address the resulting difficulties.
That evaluation becomes particularly important when the proposed sanction permanently prevents a claimant from obtaining a decision on the underlying discrimination allegations.
The point is not that the Tribunal had to agree with my explanation.
The point is that the explanation deserved consideration before the Tribunal concluded that the proceedings could not continue fairly.
The Law Has More Than One Tool
Employment Tribunals are not criminal courts, and their evidential rules are not interchangeable.
Rule 41 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 gives tribunals substantial flexibility over evidence and procedure.
The Tribunal can receive hearsay evidence. It can also assess documentary records without requiring every person mentioned in them to attend personally.
Meanwhile, Rule 33 gives tribunals powers to order disclosure of documents and information.
Rule 38 permits strike-out in defined circumstances, including where the Tribunal considers a fair hearing no longer possible.
None of those powers operates in isolation.
The Employment Appeal Tribunal’s decision in Smith v Tesco Stores Ltd [2023] EAT 11 illustrates that strike-out can withstand appeal where a tribunal properly finds serious misconduct, concludes that a fair hearing cannot take place and determines that striking out the entire claim is proportionate.
That authority does not make strike-out automatic whenever proceedings become difficult.
The Tribunal still needs to justify its conclusions and the response it chooses.
The crucial question is whether the available evidence and procedural alternatives could preserve a fair hearing despite the difficulties.
What A Hearing Could Have Examined
Consider the evidence and procedural options in this case.
The Tribunal could have examined the original recruitment emails, the shortlisting chronology, Page’s candidate records and the discrepancy surrounding the alleged August rejection call, subject to appropriate disclosure decisions.
It could also have examined the extent to which health-related information reached relevant decision-makers.
Page’s recruiter could potentially have addressed the disputed telephone conversation and the subsequent internal explanations.
As for Grey, the Tribunal could consider whether his attendance was necessary, what evidence he could provide and whether any substantiated apprehension required protective arrangements.
None of those possibilities guaranteed a fair hearing.
Nor can I establish from the published judgment alone that the Tribunal failed to consider every available option.
But they illustrate why the respondents’ account of future difficulty should not end the inquiry.
The question remains whether the Tribunal adequately established that no proportionate alternative could preserve a fair determination of the claim.
What Judge James Actually Decided
There is no value in misrepresenting the judgment.
James made extensive adverse findings concerning my conduct, correspondence, publications, non-attendance and criticism of the respondents and judicial officers.
He concluded that my conduct had made a fair trial impossible and that strike-out was proportionate. His reasoning extended well beyond Grey’s alleged apprehension.
The judgment also considered the difficulties arising from the withdrawal of Cepac’s former counsel.
And the Tribunal ordered me to pay £20,000 in costs to Cepac.
I disagree profoundly with that outcome and have pursued appellate remedies. But an informed criticism must engage with the judgment as a whole rather than isolate its weakest-looking paragraph and pretend everything else disappears.
That is precisely why the unresolved disclosure dispute matters.
The Tribunal assessed an extensive history of my conduct while the underlying discrimination allegations remained untried and relevant documentary material remained in dispute.
My criticism concerns the reasoning that connected those circumstances to the conclusion that a fair hearing was impossible.
It also concerns the apparent difference in treatment between the respondent’s account of anticipated witness difficulty and my attempts to obtain additional evidence.
The Asymmetry Nobody Can Ignore
Here is the contradiction I cannot get past.
Cepac’s solicitor conveyed the apprehension of a proposed witness who had never received personal contact from me. The Tribunal subsequently treated intimidation felt by that witness as one factor reinforcing strike-out.
Meanwhile, I pursued the documentary evidence concerning the original recruitment decision.
Page possessed records showing health-related information in the recruitment process, a disputed rejection-call chronology and correspondence about the complaint. Parts of the disclosure remained redacted despite my challenges.
The Tribunal treated those underlying issues as separate from the conduct hearing.
The two types of evidence were not identical. They served different purposes, and different legal questions governed their treatment.
But that distinction does not make their relationship irrelevant.
One concerned the possibility of future conduct affecting a witness. The other concerned the documentary history of the dispute that gave rise to the proceedings.
Both could bear upon an assessment of whether a fair hearing remained possible and what safeguards might preserve one.
The reported fear helped reinforce the decision to end the claim. The disputed documents never received examination at a substantive discrimination hearing.
That is an evidential asymmetry worthy of public scrutiny.
The Future Got Considered. The Past Never Got Tried.
Nobody needs to accuse Peter Grey of dishonesty to question the evidential weight the Tribunal gave his reported apprehension.
Nobody needs to prove a conspiracy involving Page, Cepac, Horsfield Menzies and the judiciary.
The questions arise from the chronology, the outstanding disclosure dispute and the published reasoning.
A respondent accused of disability discrimination had a proposed witness whose apprehension concerned what I might publish in the future.
The claimant had contemporaneous recruitment evidence, a disputed interview offer, an August health-related communication, an unexplained gap in the disclosed activity history and unresolved concerns about redactions.
I wanted that material examined.
Instead, the Tribunal struck out the claim before determining whether the respondents had discriminated against me.
The law rightly protects witnesses. It also exists to determine disputes, assess evidence and provide remedies where claims succeed.
If criminal courts can examine whether proceedings remain viable without particular witnesses, an Employment Tribunal ought to be able to explain convincingly why the evidence and procedural options available in its own proceedings could not preserve fairness.
That explanation matters when the result deprives a disabled litigant in person of a hearing on his substantive allegations.
The fear of something I might publish received judicial consideration. The documentary evidence of what happened during recruitment never received a substantive determination.
Peter Grey reportedly worried about what I might write.
I was trying to establish what the respondents had already written.
The future was considered. The past remained partly redacted. And the case ended before anybody had to answer the original fucking question.
Lee Thompson – Founder, The Cummins Accountability Project
Sources
- Employment Tribunal: Thompson v Cepac Limited and Page Outsourcing UK Limited, April 2026 judgment
- Crown Prosecution Service: Russell Brand Conviction, 5 November 2026
- Crown Prosecution Service: Russell Brand Sentencing, 9 November 2026
- Criminal Justice Act 2003: Section 116
- Crown Prosecution Service: Hearsay Guidance
- Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024: Rule 33
- Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024: Rule 38
- Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024: Rule 41
- Employment Appeal Tribunal: Smith v Tesco Stores Ltd [2023] EAT 11
- Information Commissioner’s Office: A Guide to Subject Access
- TCAP : Michael Page, The Ghost Call And The Client Alibi
- TCAP : Sarah-Jane Davies, The Redactions, The Refusal And The Return Of Houdini
